Experiencing Pleasure

By: Alex Bennett
Text Type: Theory
Date: 10/07/2021

Human flourishing has contained many different definitions throughout the course of the development of philosophy. Epicurean hedonism is a theory held by Epicurus which states that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. To invalidate this claim the experience machine thought experiment was conceived by Robert Nozick. The experience machine thought experiment is the theory that if there was a machine that could stimulate maximum human pleasure through simulated experiences. The idea behind this machine is that a participant would not know that it is a simulation. This experiment refutes Epicurean hedonism as it concludes that most people will not opt to enter the machine. I believe that the experience machine fails to address the form of hedonism which Epicurus explains. I refute both Epicurus and the experience machine thought experiment. First I will explain what it is that Epicurus believes. Then I will explain the rebuttal presented by the experience machine. From that I will give my own beliefs about why I find fault with both theories. I aim to explain why Epicurean hedonism is not falsifiable, and why the experience machine thought experiment is an invalid rebuttal.

According to Epicurus, human flourishing is pleasure, all things should be done to achieve pleasant feelings. This belief held by Epicurus can be labeled as hedonism. Hedonism is generally a term used in various theories about the identification of pain and pleasure. In Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus he explains a theory under the term hedonism. In this letter he discusses hedonism, death, desire, and virtues. Epicurean hedonism states that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. An intrinsic good is something that is good in nature, it does not produce goodness, but it itself is good. Epicurus thinks that everything we do is to feel pleasure. Epicurus’ view of pleasure is distinguished by his understanding of desire. Desire can be defined as a strong feeling of wanting. Epicurus establishes that there are three types of desire, natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and vain and empty desires. Epicurus states that pleasure should come from the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires. Natural and necessary desires are easy to satisfy, like food and shelter. Additionally Epicurus states that we can accept natural and unnecessary things, but we should not necessarily desire them. To deduce what is and is not intrinsically good, Epicurus introduces the idea of virtue. Virtue determines the level of pleasure something will bring you. Essentially virtue measures the necessity of things. From these statements Epicurean hedonism can be explained as pleasure being the satisfaction of natural and necessary desires which is intrinsically good. In addition to the necessity of pleasure fulfillment. Epidcurus also argues that death is nothing. To not worry about death is to experience pleasure. He presented a series of premises that explain that because death occurs to the dead it is not of our concern. I have just explained Epicurean hedonism, now I will introduce the experience machine thought experiment.

In rebuttal to Epicurean hedonism Robert Nozick developed the experience machine thought experiment. The experiment itself actually complies with the maximization of pleasure. It proposes the idea of a machine that is capable of fully simulating reality, and all the experiences that come with it. It exists to only maximize pleasure. In the experience machine every desire imaginable can be fulfilled. In the experience machine there is only pleasure. This experiment machine presents itself in a series of premises. The first of these is that the experience machine maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. Second is that you would opt out of participation in the experience machine. If you decline this experience, pleasure is not the only thing of intrinsic value. The conclusion of these premises is that pleasure is not the only intrinsic good. This conclusion presents the premise that in order for hedonism to be valid, pleasure must be the only thing of intrinsic value.Therefore Epicurean hedonism is invalid. Nozick believes that there are other intrinsic goods found in reality, this, he argues, is why we opt out of entering the experience machine. He explicitly states that there are three main reasons we have for not entering the experience machine. He states that we actually want to do and be certain things, not just experience doing and being. Additionally he argues there is value within reality. This concludes the explanation of Nozick’s thought experiment. Now I will explain why this argument is invalid.

Hedonism, specifically Epicurean hedonism, states that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. The experience machine refutes this because it claims that when we are given the opportunity to maximize our pleasure we deny it. This “proves” that pleasure is not the only intrinsic good. However Nozick does not account for desire. One of Epicurus’ main claims was that we must realign our desires. To not desire the unnecessary or the unnatural. That is to say that a world full of pleasure grounded in a fulfillment of these unnecessary desires opposes Epicurus’s. However even if the experience machine only fulfilled necessary and natural desires, it would still be flawed. Firstly there is a difference between an experience and reality. Nozick recognizes this as he claims that we would deny the experience for the real world. However Epicurus would agree in saying there is a difference between experiencing pleasure and feeling pleasure. Epicurean hedonism is rooted in reality, pleasure exists because pain exists. I could even argue that in a world without pain there is no pleasure. Therefore by entering the experience machine we suddenly become unable to feel pleasure, it becomes a baseline for emotion. Since Epicurean hedonism is rooted in reality the experience machine is not, therefore they fail to compare experiences. I have just explained the flaws in the experience machine rebuttal. I will now explain the issue of Epicurean hedonism.

Epicurean hedonism, as previously stated, is based in reality. Despite this fact it detaches most feelings and experiences from its application. By this I mean that hedonism tells us not to feel, when logically, feeling is natural. Epicurean hedonism states that it values the natural, and the necessary, but then rejects all natural experiences that are not pleasure. Realistically, we cannot ignore the tragedies of the world. Epicurus states that “death is nothing” (Epicurus; 341-270 BC). This statement accompanies the claim that we should be indifferent to death. This claim is invalid because he states that death happens to the dead. Death also happens to the living, just differently. Say a family member were to die, and they provided an irreplaceable aspect to the family, ie. income, food, shelter. Epicurus would state that without this natural and necessary fulfillment pleasure would decrease. Then I claim that it would also be logical to elicit an emotional response to this death. I also would argue that there are other intrinsic goods. The experience machine is correct in this aspect. Truth, and honesty both come from existing in reality. I believe that these things are intrinsically good. If Epicurean hedonism values pleasure, it should also value pleasure that is honest. Pleasure, I believe, can only exist if it is honest. Although hedonists would disagree, there are aspects to hedonism that are inherently evil. Hedonism is selfish. Pleasure should not only exist on an individual level. When we prioritize our own pleasure we could, consequently cause others pain. Another example of this is only feeding oneself and disregarding the need of a brother, or of a child. This pleasure of eating cannot be good if it is causing others pain. From this I conclude that Epicurean hedonism is not valid.


References:
Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ reprinted fromBailey, Cyril B., (1926)Epicurus: The Extant Remains, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Robert Nozick, ‘The Experience Machine’, in (2007)Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed. by Russ Shafer-Landau, Blackwell, pp.264–65.